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Abstract
This paper reviews the achievements of the Labour Government’s
education policy between 1997 and 2001. Tony Blair claimed that his
Government would make education a priority. The first part of the
paper reviews the scale of education spending in relation to the
economy at large and within the education budget. The second part of
the paper looks at the productivity of schools. How far have the changes
that have affected schools in the past ten years and the past five in
particular affected the quality of school achievements? The paper
suggests there have been significant improvements not just on average
but especially in the gains made in poor areas and in the least good
schools. Finally the paper discusses the funding of higher education, the
introduction of income related loans to cover maintenance and up front
fees. The paper concludes some serious errors were made in policy
design. Even so the use of the Inland Revenue as the collection agency
was a successful innovation and should be built upon.




Tony Blair famously described Labour’s priorities for government as
“Education, Education and Education” in his Labour Party Conference
speech of 1996. Five years later we are entitled to ask if that claim can be
sustained.
Re-reading Tony Blair’s speech it is difficult for an economist to
disagree with the diagnosis, at least. The modern economy seems to
have a voracious demand for highly skilled people. During the past
decade the numbers of young people going onto higher education has
doubled as a share of the age group. That represents a quite
unprecedented growth in sheer numbers of graduates coming onto the
labour market. You might have expected this to depress graduates’
earnings relative to non-graduates. In fact, the gap widened in the 1990s
and was wider than in 1974 (Machin 1999). The UK’s levels of human
c a p i t a le n d o w m e n ti nt h ew o r k i n gp o p u l a t i o nh a v eb e e nt r a n s f o r m e di n
the past twenty-five years (see Table 1). In 1974 over half of all men
between 16 and 69 had no qualifications at all and two thirds of women.
Now the figures are 15 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. In 1974
only four per cent of the male work force had degrees. Now 16 per cent
do. Only one per cent of women had degrees in 1974. Now 13 per cent
do. But it seems this has not been enough. A recent OECD study (OECD
2001) showed that that higher education for women was more
powerfully linked to higher earnings than in any other member country












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































High levels of skill are not just necessary for a successful economy.
They also impact on the distribution of income. The spread of skills
helps determine the spread of incomes. A low skill labour force attracts
and sustains firms that need a low skill mix. Low skills are related to
high unemployment and to low pay (Layard et al 2001). High
concentrations of those with poor skills in poor areas make it very
difficult to rescue areas with high concentrations of poverty as our own
work in the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion is showing (Lupton
2001). In short it is no accident that the UK has one of the greatest
inequalities in educational performance in the advanced economies and
one of the widest spreads in income distribution. Poor numeracy skills
turn out to be one of the strongest predictors of poverty and low income
in later life both in the US (Murname, Willett and Levy 1995). Poor
qualifications and low achievement at school are strong predictors of
social exclusion in later life on a range of measures even when all kinds
of other factors like parental poverty are taken into account (Hobcraft
2000). As the Moser Report (1999) showed we have far more functional
illiteracy in the UK than in other European countries.
In short, Blair and his government must be given full marks for
getting the diagnosis right. If you want to eliminate child poverty and
tackle social exclusion, the key is to raise the basic skills of those at the
bottom and ensure an adequate supply of more highly educated people
so that they do not get paid scarcity wages.
Policy activity
Here again if sheer legislative and administrative activity were our
guide the Government would get high marks. There have been thirty-six
major policy initiatives between 1997and 2001 and no doubt some I have
missed! (See Annex 1) No less than a third have to do with some kind of
initiative targeted at schools in poor areas or at those with low skills.
Another third have to do with expanding apprenticeships, further and
higher education. Much of the rest have to do with raising standards
more generally.
Some of the most important changes will take a long time to bear
fruit. The complete overhaul of the system for training 16-18 year olds –
the Foundation Modern Apprenticeships announced in 1997 will begin
training 86,000 young people this year on top of 77,000 Advanced
Modern Apprenticeship places, a scheme introduced by the last
government. After the collapse of such training in the 1980s this looks a
very important and welcome change but it is too early to judge
outcomes.4
Pilot schemes to give grants to low income families to encourage
those young people to stay on and reward good performance and
attendance began in 1999 and will last for three years before legislation
is introduced, learning from the experiments. That is something I have
been urging for thirty years! But, again, too soon to see results. The
trouble is that educational reforms take a decade to bear fruit – or many
do. The Government committed itself to implement nearly all of the
proposals in the Moser Report (1999). This puts in place a significant
programme to improve the literacy and numeracy skills of adults who
have missed out in their years of schooling. It is one of the most
important and heartening things the government has done. Once more
though it is far too early to see results.
So, high marks to the Government for trying to do things of which
economists would approve. But some marks should be taken off for the
sheer number and complexity of these initiatives. They produce
administrative overload for those on the receiving end.
However, for an economist the real questions are – did the high
policy priority manifest itself in more resources and what were the
outcomes? Were there improved school outcomes not only for the
average child but, especially, for the poor and low performers? Did the
changes to funding higher education improve the efficiency and equity
of the system?
So I shall concentrate on three issues in this paper:
   overall funding;
   school performance;
   the funding of higher education.
I Education spending 1997-2003
More money for schools is no guarantee of better results. There is a
major controversy on just this point amongst economists (Burtless 1996).
A recent paper in the Economic Journal (Gundlach, Woessman and
Gmelin 2001) argues that in most OECD countries over the past twenty-
five years, Britain included, pupil performance has remained stubbornly
constant even though spending per pupil in real terms has risen. The
authors follow Hanushek’s (1997) conclusion on US schooling and talk
about a ‘productivity collapse’ in OECD countries’ schools. It is teachers,
not pupils, who have benefited from increased education spending, they
argue. So spending has risen but performance has not. Each teacher is5
costing more and producing the same. The output per pound spent on
education has fallen.
The authors’ figures only go up to 1995. So what has happened
since? Does the story still hold for the UK? Before we turn to look at
school outcomes we need to examine what happened to education
spending in the UK after 1995, and more particularly since 1997?
It has proved extraordinarily difficult to get up to date figures for
the UK. The last detailed breakdown of official figures for UK spending
on education, at the time of the lecture, were for 1997/8! Devolution
may be a good thing in many respects but it makes UK statistics a
problem! With the help of some long suffering and helpful civil servants
in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and HM Treasury I have put
together a time series of education spending series in real terms. It is
consistent with that in the last edition of The State of Welfare (Glennerster
1998).
1
It turns out that 1975/6 was the high water mark for public
spending on education. It reached 6.5 per cent of the GDP in that year.
To this we should add another 0.3 per cent private spending. The public
spending cuts that followed steadily reduced that share until it reached
4.7 per cent in 1988/9. Demography played a part but only a part of this
story. University spending was held down despite a steady rise in the
age group ‘at risk’, for example. See Table 2 for the breakdown of
spending by sector. Then education’s share began to rise again. It rose to
5.2 per cent in 1994/5. Faced with a decline in state spending private
individuals responded by spending more themselves, pushing the total
share of education spending in the economy back up to 6.1 per cent.
Private spending came to add a fifth to the overall amount the nation as
a whole spent on education. There are undoubtedly a complex series of
factors lying behind this. Nevertheless, the basic fact has been that when
the state has cut back its spending below the rate at which incomes are
rising, after a short time lag private spending has risen to compensate,
though not of course the benefiting the same people. The percentage of
the population going to private schools has not increased. (See Annex
Table 3.) What seems to be happening is that parents who have children
1 In fact the Treasury series for education’s share of the GDP is not consistent
with the Office of National Statistics in the past few years. I am told that this
is because the two bodies use a slightly different definition of education! For
recent years I have stuck to the Treasury definition since the Treasury’s
figures are more up to date. The differences only amount to 0.2 per cent of
GDP and the trends are the same.6
at private schools are prepared to spend more in fees to keep increasing
their children’s standard of schooling. Fees are rising by six per cent a
year in cash terms or 3.5 per a year in real terms (ISIS 2001). That
compares with a virtual standstill in state school spending per pupil in
the mid 1990s as we shall see. More of parents’ money is also going to
support their children’s higher education and more is being spent on
privately and publicly provided training courses.
The public spending recovery was to be short lived. From 1995
public spending on education slipped as a share of the GDP. That began
under the Conservatives and, given the Labour Government’s
determination to keep to the Conservative plans in 1997 it went on
falling. In 1998/9 and 1999/2000 it fell to 4.5 per cent – lower than in the
depths of the Thatcher cut backs and the lowest figure since the early
1960s (Glennerster 1997 for earlier figures).
Essentially what happened was that levels of spending in ‘real
terms’ remained static while the GDP rose. However, the measure of
‘real terms spending’ as used by the Treasury merely takes into account
t h er i s ei ngeneral inflation. If incomes in general are rising as the GDP
rises, the pay of teachers and other staff needs to rise too otherwise the
relative quality of teachers that can be recruited will fall.
Public spending did begin to rise again in 1999. The figure for this
financial year is 5.0 per cent and, according to the Treasury as a result of
the last Comprehensive Spending Review it will be 5.3 per cent of GDP
by 2003/4 (HM Treasury 2000). Even that would only put state
education spending back to the levels of the early 1990s! See Table 2.
So by no stretch of the term “priority” could it be said to have
applied to state education spending in the first two years of the Labour
Government. Within that total spending on nursery and primary schools
did continue to rise after 1997 at the same time as there was a fall in the
size of that population. This is where the Government put its priority.
The Government was able to use that demographic breathing space to
extend pre school education to all four year olds whose parents wanted
it. As a result the percentage of three and four year olds in school rose
from 58 per cent in 1996/7 to nearly 64 per cent in 2000 for the United
Kingdom as a whole. This still leaves us with a lower participation rate
than most European countries for 3-4 year olds but a higher one than





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Scottish primary schools 1997/8 1998/9 1999/00 2000/1
% of classes taught with:
1-20 pupils 12 11 12 14
21-30 pupils 68 71 73 72
31 or more pupils 21 19 15 14
Average size of class (nos.) 25 25 25 24
Scottish secondary
schools
1996/7 1997/8 1998/9 1999/00 2000/1
Pupil/teacher ratio 13 13 13 13 13
Source: Personal communication from Scottish Executive
Note: (1) secondary school class information is not available due to the structure of
the curriculum; (2) primary school class information is not available prior to 1997/8;
(3) primary information is for single stage classes only; (4) classes of 30 or more with
2 teachers have been removed from the data, except in 1997/8 where this was not
possible.
The number of primary classes in England with over 30 pupils was
reduced from 28 per cent in 1996/7 to 17 per cent in 2000/1. However,
the average size of class barely changed – classes presumably fell from
just over 30 to just under the magic number. See Table 3 above. There is
a similar trend in Scotland, though class sizes were lower there to start
with.
The size of the secondary school population on the other hand
continued to rise. Nearly all the extra funding there went to teach the
extra pupils. It was not until 1999/2000 that real per pupil spending in
secondary schools rose above the 1995/6 levels in England and a year
later in Scotland. See Table 4. From then on the government are
promising a much larger boost in per pupil spending for both primary
and secondary schools up by over a quarter in real terms by 2003/4.
Welcome though that is it has been a long time coming.
State funding per head for further and higher education fell
steadily through the 1980s and early 1990s (Glennerster 1998). It has
continued to do so. Per pupil public support for higher education fell by
ten per cent between 1995 and 1997 and has only roughly stabilised
since. See Table 5. To this public funding the Labour Government added
the additional fees richer students were required to pay after autumn































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































So schools gained little by way of extra resources between 1995 and
1998/9. What of their performance? The criticism levelled by the authors
of the Economic Journal paper and their American predecessors is that
state schools perform badly because they exist in a competitive free
environment and have no external form of performance measurement to
act as an external spur. Now neither of these general points any longer
holds for the United Kingdom.
Schools, and primary schools in particular, have been subject to
the biggest change in the pattern of incentives that govern them for a
generation. Much of the rationale for these big changes came from
economists. They argued that control of school resources should be
devolved to the level of the school. That would permit decisions about
staffing, the mix of staff and technology, the choice of suppliers and
control of maintenance work could all be done where the knowledge
about the local situation was richest and where performance could be
monitored and corrective action taken most effectively (Chubb and Moe
1990; Ladd 1996; Burgess 1997). When a child kicks a ball through a
window it is no longer necessary to send a request to County Hall for
someone to appear six months later to mend it. An odd job man down
the road can do it that night.
On the other hand knowledge about relative standards your
pupils were achieving or exactly what to teach and how best to do it
may not lie at the level of the individual class room teacher- the old
British tradition. Hence the case for a National Curriculum and national
tests which set relative standards and, more recently, prescribed literacy
and numeracy hours. It is all too easy and understandable for a teacher
faced with a difficult class or a subject she or he is not too confident in to
spend time on other tasks. As my wife, who used to teach maths to
intending primary school teachers, once observed – “Most of my
students are scared stiff of maths and take every excuse not to teach it if
they can.”
On its own that was not enough. There had to be some incentives
for schools to perform on and not inside their production possibility
frontier. That was to be achieved by a whole series of pressures schools
were put under by the previous government – greater parental choice
backed up with pupil based funding( q u a s im a r k e tv o u c h e r s ) ,t h e
national testing of pupils and the publication of results. It is certainly
true, as many parents complain, that they cannot get their children into12
the most popular schools. They do not expand to meet demand any
more than the top private schools do. But the threat of parents taking
away their child or not choosing a school if it is performing badly, and
hence not bringing their money with them, does act as a real incentive to
worry about the schools academic results. This has both good and bad
consequences as we discuss later. But the lack of an efficiency motive, of
which the authors of the Economic Journal paper complained, is no longer
true. The full system of testing pupils at 7, 11 14 and 16 did not come
into effective force until 1995 /6.
Taken together, and for good or ill, this was a series of measures
that derived to a significant extent from micro economic theory. It
marked a profound change in the assumptions under which schools
operated. The interesting thing for this paper is that, unlike in health,
where much of the quasi market reforms were diluted by the incoming
Labour Government, the Thatcher education reform package was
retained and, if anything, strengthened. More of the budgets were
devolved to schools. There was no let up in performance testing or
publication of results and on top of this an experiment begun under the
previous administration was introduced nationally and extended to
mathematics - literacy and numeracy hours. These set recommended
ways of teaching these subjects for a given period of time each day.
Before examining what has happened since 1995 and 1997 it is
worth reminding ourselves what had been the record of pupil
performance in British schools in the previous thirty years. We only
have comparable results over time for maths. That means we do not
know how far changes in maths achievements are representative. There
are difficulties in measuring skill levels over time – syllabi change. But
maths is a core skill and the basics can be tested and do not change all
that much. With all those qualifications what these surveys suggest is
that there had not been any significant improvement in basic maths
capacity of early years secondary school children since the mid 1960s,
indeed, a small decline. They also suggested that the poor performance
of the very lowest achievers that has characterised British education for
so long had continued.
More recent trends in science scores showed some improvement.
The number passing O level, GCSE and A level have improved over the
same period but GCSE significantly changed the nature of school
leaving exams and the numbers gaining A level are as much affected by
staying on rates as basic skill knowledge. (For a summary of the trends,
sources and caveats see Glennerster 1998). So, despite the caveats the
balance of evidence suggests that basic maths skills possessed by early13
years secondary school children had not improved for a long period up
to 1995. It is against that background that the results of the national
attainment tests are so surprising.
These tests are designed to see how far pupils achieve certain
standards deemed necessary to be a functioning citizen. Levels of
expected achievement are set for ages 7,11, 14 and 16 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: National Achievements Tests
Key Stages Levels Ages
11 + 2 * 7
23 + 4 * 1 1
35 * + 6 1 4
47 + 8 G C S E
Source: DfES Statistics Bulletins: 04/98; 08/99; 03/00; 04/01
* expected level of achievement
Table 6 shows the percentage of pupils reaching the expected levels at
each age in the tested subjects.
The overall pattern of results is very clear. There has been a steady
improvement at all levels and in each subject, apart from the occasional
blip, across all five years. The improvements have been particularly
striking at level four – the end of primary school. For example, by the
end of primary school the percentage of pupils gaining the expected
levels of competence in maths was 70 per cent in 2001. This was up from
45 per cent in 1995. The pace of improvement quite naturally slowed in
the past year but was continuing across the board at level 2, in writing
and science at level 4 and in maths at level 5. Reading and maths scores
had fallen back slightly at level 4. Nevertheless, the picture over the
whole period remains remarkable, if we can believe the figures, a point
we discuss more below.
It is impossible to assign relative weights to any one of the
measures we listed previously but in combination they do seem to have
produced a step change in pupil outcomes at least in primary schools,
and this despite minimal extra resources given to schools in the period
in question.





(c) 1998 1999 2000 2001
(d)
Level 2
Reading 78 78 80 80 82 81 84
Writing 80 79 80 81 83 84 86
M a t h s 7 9 8 2 8 48 58 39 0 9 1
Level 3
Reading 49 57 67 71 78 83 81
Writing - - 53 52 54 55 57
M a t h s 4 5 5 4 6 25 86 97 2 7 0
S c i e n c e 7 0 6 2 6 96 97 98 5 8 7
Level 5
E n g l i s h5 5 5 7 5 76 56 46 4 6 4
M a t h s 5 8 5 7 6 05 96 36 5 6 6
S c i e n c e 5 6 5 7 6 06 25 56 9 6 6
Source: DfES Statistical Bulletins: Table 19,4/98; Table 18, 4/01, SFR40 2001
Notes: (a) participating schools 90%; (b) 95%; (c) 90%; (d) provisional
With the exception of a temporary drop once in science at level 5 and very
marginally in Maths level 4 and 5 there has been consistent improvement, some
modest, some very substantial, especially at level 4.
We should, however, be properly sceptical.
   Is it just that children and teachers have learned how to do tests
and there is no real underlying improvement? The fact that the
improvements have lasted as long and been so large makes that a
doubtful excuse.
   Perhaps a large number of heads are cooking the books. I find that
difficult to believe even if the odd case has emerged.
   More firm counter evidence may be the tests administered to a
national sample of children aged 13 in 1999 as part of a regular
international survey of achievement – the International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievements
reported in (OECD 2001). Maths and science scores in 1999 did not
show up as statistically different compared to those of 1995. The
range of skills measured in this international survey are not the
same as the national tests in England. They apply to secondary
schools. They only apply to a sample of schools and the incentives
children have to try to do well in them is minimal. The national
assessment tests matter to the teachers and the pupils. Finally, the15
progress we reported above was particularly strong for primary
and not secondary schools. Nevertheless, future results of this
international survey must be watched with care.
Poor schools?
One of the fears critics of the new system of school choice and school
funding expressed (Glennerster 1991) was that it would increase the
gaps between schools and especially those in richer and poorer areas. In
practice the combined effects of all the strategies we have described does
not seem to support this fear though far more could be done to guard
against possible perverse effects.
Table 7 shows what has been happening in the median school in
each year (that is the middle school if all were ranked from top to
bottom). But it also shows the scores of the school just in the top quarter
and the school just in the bottom quarter of schools the 75
th and the 25
th
percentile schools. We show the results at Key Stage 2 or at eleven years
in Table 7. Comparable results for the other levels are shown in the
Annexe Tables. Detailed figures of this kind are only available up to the
year 2000.
If anything there has been a greater improvement by the lowest
performing schools. This is again especially evident in the primary
schools. The gap between the top and bottom quartile school in maths at
age eleven was 32 per cent in 1997 and 25 per cent in 2000. It narrowed
from 30 to 24 points in English and from 28 to 19 points in science.
The narrowing at the end of secondary school is nothing like as
great, as can be seen from Annexe tables 4 and 5. However, the effect is
still there. By the age of fourteen the gap in English between the top
quartile school and the bottom was 32 points. It was 26 points in 2000.
There was little change in the gap in maths and science – merely an
improvement across the board. But there was no widening gap.16
Table 7: Gap Between the Scores Of Schools 1995-2000 (Maintained Schools)*
Key stage 2: 11 years
Level 4+
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
English
75
th percentile 65 78 80 84 88
Median 50 67 67 73 78
25
th percentile 35 52 52 61 64
Maths
75
th percentile 63 78 75 83 85
Median 47 65 61 72 74
25
th percentile 31 50 44 59 60
Science
75
th percentile 88 86 85 92 96
Median 76 73 73 83 88
25
th percentile 60 58 57 71 77
Source: DfES Statistical Bulletins: Table 19, 4/98; Table 18, 4/01
*Figures are for the 75
th percentile school, median and 25
th percentile school. They
show the % of pupils in these schools who have reached the expected level.
The gap between the top and bottom schools narrowed in each subject.
Table 8: Interquartile Range Of Schools - % Of Pupils Reaching Expected Level
Key stage 2: 11 years
Level 4+
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
E n g l i s h 3 02 62 82 32 4
M a t h s 3 22 83 12 42 5
S c i e n c e 2 82 82 82 11 9
The gap between the top and bottom schools narrowed in each subject.
Perhaps even more striking is the fact that the schools with a high
number of pupils on free school meals (over 40 per cent) have been
catching up with the schools where less than five per cent of pupils have
free meals. Free school meals take up, as an indicator of poverty, has
been highly correlated with poor school performance. If we take the
median school in each group as the indicator we can see that in 1997
only 37 per cent of children at eleven had reached their expected levels
of performance in English and Maths. (See Table 9). By 2000 that figure
had increased to 55 and 53 per cent with science achievements up from
45 to 70 per cent of children. These are extremely encouraging results17
though we only have to look at the figures for key stage three to be
depressed again. In 1997 no child in these schools reached the expected
levels in either English or Maths or Science. No one did in English in
2000 and only 13 and 14 per cent in Maths and Science. So in these
schools in poor areas a huge amount still needs to be done.
Table 9: Poor Schools
Rich Poor Median schools in group
1997 1999 2000 1997 1999 2000
Key stage 1
Reading 91 93 94 62 67 70
Writing 92 94 94 62 68 71
Maths 94 91 98 70 76 81
Key stage 2
English 80 87 89 37 48 55
Maths 79 85 86 37 49 53
Science 85 92 95 45 60 70
Key stage 3
English 75 84 83 0 8 0
Maths 78 82 83 0 9 14
Science 79 78 79 0 5 13
Source: DfES Statistical Bulletins: Table 19, 4/98; Table 18, 4/01
Rich = up to 5% with free school meals; Poor = over 40% with free school meals
Certainly our study in CASE of the views of parents in very poor
areas about their services supports these results (Mumford 2001). Nearly
half felt their primary schools, in particular, were getting better. The
reasons they articulated included some special measures taken to
improve a failing school, the introduction of home work, after school
activities, improvements to the physical building, hearing about
improved academic results, the expulsion of bullies and increasing
sensitivity to the needs of ethnic minority populations.18




Reading 29 26 24
Writing 30 26 23
Maths 24 15 17
Key Stage 2
English 43 39 34
Maths 42 36 33
Science 40 32 25
Key Stage 3
English 75 76 83
Maths 78 73 69
Science 79 73 66
Source: DfES Statistical Bulletins: Table 19, 4/98; Table 18, 04/01
A slow improvement in poor schools at Key Stage 1 and 2. A long way to go at Key
Stage 3. Rich = up to 5% with free school meals. Poor = over 40% with free school
meals. Median schools in group used for analysis
What caveats should we enter about these figures?
   First, it will be objected that there is a ceiling affect. The schools at
the top are already near the targets. They have little room for
improvement. The schools at the bottom have nowhere to go but
up. The problem with that objection is that it also held for the
thirty years in which no improvement took place. This is a real
change.
   It is true that the top schools may be doing even better beyond the
expected levels. Inequality may not have improved. This is the old
argument between relative and absolute poverty. Both matter.
A n dt om ym i n da b s o l u t ep o v e r t y ,o ri nt h i sc a s ef u n c t i o n a l
illiteracy, matters more. It may be that in the rich schools some
pupils are much quicker at reading their Harry Potter or using the
internet in ways that go beyond the scores set in the national tests.
But that was not what the government set out to achieve. It
wanted to raise all children’s skills to a minimum level. What
matters is that there has been a real improvement in poor
children’s basic skills, their capacity to function in modern society.19
So to return to Gundlach et al’s paper in the Economic Journal
earlier this year, the “productivity collapse” they describe hardly seems
to fit the UK in the past five years. Spending stagnated but output grew
in a way unseen for thirty years. It could be called a “productivity
explosion.” The reason seems to be that the combination of reforms in
the past decade have made a difference. The reforms include: devolved
budgetary responsibility, the setting of national standards, some degree
of parental exit power with money following pupil and school choice
and some requirement by the centre to follow ‘good practice’ – the
numeracy and literacy hours. It is impossible to disentangle the precise
contribution of each element of these reforms. They mostly happened
together and are interdependent. Some reforms happened earlier –
notably the introduction of GCSE. The quasi market elements probably
most affected secondary schools and the numeracy and literacy hours
only affected primary schools.
One on my worries early on (Glennerster 1991) was that such
competition would merely induce cream skimming or competition for
the better pupils rather than improved efficiency. There is conflicting
evidence on cream skimming (Gorad and Fitz 1998; Gerwitz, Ball and
Bowe 1995). However, not all the competition to attract better pupils has
been successfully achieved by the better schools. The incentives to
undertake it are greatest for the least well performing schools. Research
done in poor neighbourhoods by CASE suggests that one response of
head teachers in poor areas has been to go out and actively woo a wider
mix of pupils by selling their school beyond its traditional recruitment
area. This has plausibly had spin off, or peer group effects, on poorer
pupils in such schools, as well as raising the average score of the school
b yt h em e r ep r e s e n c eo fm o r ea b l eo rm otivated students. We know that
less able pupils gain more from a mixed ability environment than able
pupils lose by leaving a more select environment (Robertson and
Symons 1996). In short we need to know a lot more about the dynamics
that have lain behind these changes in pupil performance.
It is clear, however, that many of the most deprived schools face
very little effective competition. Few parents in very poor areas seek to
send their children to schools beyond their most local one. The exit
sanction is weak. Moreover, there are still incentives for schools to cream
skim. Value added scores for schools in the league tables remain very
slow in coming. The Government has not done enough to compensate
schools for the extra demands that poorer performing or difficult pupils
put on the school. Ideally, a school should be indifferent between
accepting a child with differing potential or problems compared to20
another pupil. If it were to receive sufficient additional rewards for
taking difficult pupils that could be achieved. We have to find a more
rigorous and evidence based allocation to schools in deprived areas.
III Funding higher education
One of the most fundamental changes the Labour Government made
was in the funding of higher education. Here they had the opportunity
to put right the previous government’s mistakes and failed. Indeed, the
very things they got right about schools they got wrong with higher
education. There now seems some prospect of a rethink if the papers are
to be believed.
Economists have been advocating some kind of student loan
scheme as a way of funding higher education ever since Milton
Friedman’s proposals in 1962. The previous Conservative Government
had partially gone down this road. The scheme forgave loan repayments
from the poor but had many of the characteristics of a mortgage loan
and it only covered some of the costs of maintenance. Others had long
argued against mortgage type loan schemes. They would deter poor
students and be unfair on later low earners. Much better to have fully
income related repayments and those who did well out of higher
education should repay at least some of the cost of tuition. My own first
published paper as a new lecturer at the LSE back in 1968 (Glennerster et
al 1968) suggested a Graduate Tax – using the income tax system as the
repayment vehicle. I saw it as a way to fund a rapid expansion of higher
education without diverting large sums into the pockets of the present
and future middle classes! For a time it seemed as if the Labour
Government was about to implement that idea.
A f t e ram a j o re n q u i r yi n t of u n d i n gh i g h e re d u c a t i o nt h eD e a r i n g
Committee reported in 1997 just after the Election (Dearing 1997). It
recommended that graduates should make a contribution equivalent to
25 per cent of the average cost of their tuition while they were in work on
some income contingent basis. (Recommendation 79) This was much in
line with what many economists had been recommending and was
similar to the scheme the Australian Government had introduced in
1989.
In the end the UK Government only partially implemented these
ideas and did so in a way that was both unpopular, misconceived and
only raised a tiny amount of cash.21
The first leg of the government’s plan was to transform the
maintenance grant into a more generous income contingent loan made
through the Student Loans Company that would be repaid through the
Inland Revenue. This minimised dangers of default and provided an
efficient repayment mechanism linked to an individual’s taxable
capacity and their benefit from the system. This was a major
breakthrough. For years the Inland Revenue and the Treasury had
resisted this idea. It meant that more generous support could be given to
students without the full cost appearing as public expenditure. Since
part of the risk was being taken by the Student Loans Company and
students would be paying for part of the cost of the loan future burdens
on the taxpayer would be minimised. That was all before the days of
resource accounting. Now the effect will be more transparent and the
benefits of the new system will be that much greater. Thus far so very
good.
However, the Government then made a number of crucial errors
(Barr 2001).
Fees
It needed cash for the universities then and there. They were in a bad
way financially. Their cash per pupil had been cut by ten per cent as we
have seen. Some were on the edge of bankruptcy. For them to receive
deferred fees from students several years later would have been no help.
The Treasury was not prepared to accept that increased support for
universities in the interim should not count as public spending despite
the increased revenue stream such a scheme would engender. So the
government went for means tested fees paid up front. That extra could
then be paid directly to universities without raising public expenditure.
Poor students would be exempt but parents of the richest third would
pay £1000 a year. At a stroke this got the whole scheme a bad name.
   It went back on the principle of undergraduate education being
free at the point of use. The hostility to breaking this principle has
over lain the other much more sensible system of income
contingent loans for maintenance costs. The fact that fees are not
paid by children of poor parents is something very few seem to
realise. So a bad signal is sent out despite the attempt to help the
poor.
   Precisely because such a move was unpopular the fee level was
kept low and it only applied in full to a minority of students. As a
consequence the sums raised in fees were tiny in relation to
universities’ needs. The total revenue from undergraduate22
statutory fees amounted to only £350 million in England in 2001/2,
rising to £400 million in 2003/4. (Hansard Written Answer 9 July
2001). Total spending on higher and further education was
running at £ 10 billion at the turn of the century See Table 2.
   Nor could institutions vary them to reflect the different costs of
teaching in different institutions or to compete on quality and cost.
   Fees did not vary by subject though some subjects cost five times
as much as to teach as others. The student is indifferent between
an expensive engineering course and a cheap course in maths and
computing which are the skills many employers are looking for in
engineering students!
   It relied on parents’ willingness to pay and not on students’ own
decisions about whether the price was worth paying at some
future date.
   Risks of failure or poor performance faced by working class
students do appear to be greater than for middle class students
(Naylor et al 2001). There were other ways to address this problem
if policy makers wished to than a means tested fee. Maintenance
grants for six formers from low income families see below might
be a way forward.
Loans for Maintenance
The new way to fund student maintenance, a loan repaid through later
tax payments, also had major weaknesses.
   Critically, the government set a nil real rate of interest. The sum to
be repaid was the amount borrowed indexed for prices and that
was all. This meant two things.
♦  When the Treasury calculates the cost of the loans scheme to
public expenditure the loan subsidy element is a large one. It
amounts to about a third of the cost of the scheme (Barr
2001). The potential benefits are thus much reduced.
♦  It encourages rich parents to use the scheme. Who after all
would turn up the chance of an interest free loan if they can
help it? Such, at least, was American experience of non-
means tested cheap loans for students. It increases the public
spending cost of the scheme to no good purpose.
   Partly to offset this tendency, the availability of the loans is
limited. There is a means tested ceiling to the loans available
dependent on parental income and scholarship income. This
makes the whole scheme vastly more complex than it need be.
Instructions to local authorities on how to operate the scheme23
amount to 150 pages. There is a disincentive for universities to
offer scholarships to poor students and much else.
   The limits to the amount students could “borrow” were too low
especially for students living in high cost areas.
   The threshold at which repayments begin is too high. Too many
do not repay or repay late. Taken together with the nil interest this
reduces the revenue still further. To put it another way, for the
same revenue you could set a lower repayment percentage.
Scotland
The fees issue became a major element in the Scottish elections and after
the coalition Government was formed there the Scots went nearer to
producing a sensible scheme. Fees would be paid back after graduation
through the same mechanism as the maintenance loan – the Inland
Revenue. Again, so far so good.
However, the scheme still uses a nil real interest rate and has a
much higher threshold than in England £17,500 nearly twice the English
level. Thus the Scots get even less relief to their public spending limits
than the English.
Central controls
Along with a complex and centrally controlled system of funding has
gone a steady increase in other kinds of “quality” control largely
concerned with process and not with outcome. For the last Teaching
Quality Assessment Review I remember weighing the material we, as a
single department had been asked to submit. It came to about a fifth of a
ton!
A balance sheet
The good thing is that we now have in place, especially in Scotland, an
effective mechanism for collecting income contingent repayments for
both maintenance grants and fees. The bad thing is that this mechanism
has been tainted by the introduction of up front fees and has not been
implemented in such a way as to maximise the revenue and public
spending gains that could have accrued. The potential available revenue
could be used to enhance access from poorer groups. So far as we can
see the changes in student support in the 1990s has not worsened
d i f f e r e n t i a ls o c i a lc l a s sa c c e s s .S e eT a b l e1 1 .T h i sm a yc o m ea sas u r p r i s e ,
given the bad press both loans and fees have had. The reasons may
include:24
   The important thing to remember is that differential social class
drop out occurs long before people apply to go to university. It
happens at 16. That was true when the Robbins Committee
reported in 1963 and it is still true.
   The other factor that affects social class access is the width of the
gate through which applicants have to pass. The narrower the gate
t h em o r et h em i d d l ec l a s sg a i n .T h ewider the gate relatively more
working class students enter. Robbins (1963) again showed this.
The expansion of the 1990s had a similar result despite the possible
adverse effects of the changes in funding. This shows how
i m p o r t a n ti ti st ok e e pt h eg a t ew i d e .
   The private rates of return gained by middle class children from
staying on are less than those gained by working class children
(Bennett, Glennerster and Nevison 1992). They already have
parent and friend networks that give them privileged access to the
labour market whether they went to university or not. Facing them
with at least some of the costs of higher education may have
deterred the marginal student and have done so quite
appropriately. Already about four fifths of professional class
children were going to university in the mid 1990s.
2
2 Since this lecture was given the Government have announced a review of
higher education finance and student support (Times Higher Education
Supplement, October 5 2001).25
Table 11: Participation rates in higher education in Great Britain: by social
class, 1991-99, %
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99
Professional 55 71 73 78 79 82 79 72
Intermediate 36 39 42 45 45 47 48 45
Skilled non-
manual 22 27 29 31 31 32 31 29
Skilled manual 11 15 17 18 18 18 19 18
Partly skilled 12 14 16 17 17 17 18 17
Unskilled 6 9 11 11 12 13 14 13
A l ls o c i a lc l a s s e s 2 3 2 8 3 0 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 1
Source: Social Trends Dataset, personal communication from ONS.
Note: The number of home domiciled initial entrants aged under 21 to full-time and
sandwich undergraduate courses of higher education in further and higher education
expressed as a proportion of the averaged 18-19 population. The 1991 Census
provided the population distribution by social class for all years. This may have
changed. If it has it is likely that the population base for the professional and
managerial as well as the non-manual group will be higher than in 1991 - the manual
group lower. This will over estimate the figures in the table for the manual groups
and underestimate for the higher social groups.
In Brief
In brief we can say that in first four years of the Labour Government
took a number of important policy initiatives but let education spending
fall to its lowest point for four decades (For the historical figures see
Glennerster 1997). Despite that, standards improved significantly in
primary schools as a result of a series of measures begun by the previous
government and pushed further by this one. Not only did average
standards of achievement rise but the gap between the lowest achieving
schools and the rest narrowed in terms of reaching target levels. So too
did the gap between schools with many poor pupils and richer
children’s schools.
Performance by the end of secondary school has improved far less.
The performance of schools in poor areas, or with a high percentage of
poor pupils, is still dramatically below that of even the average school. It
is here that our policy ingenuity has to be focused. There are some
promising policies in the pipe line – maintenance grants for poor
children to make staying on more financially attractive, vocational
courses, bursaries for children from poor schools at university. But this26
nut will be harder to crack. We have done far too little to offset the
incentives for schools to cream skim the most able or the least difficult to
teach.
Important changes were made in the funding of higher education.
Here the government got it partly right and partly wrong. Using the
Inland Revenue as a way to collect back some of the gains the higher
paid reap from the taxpayers’ investment in them was a bold step that
has worked. The pity is that the same principle was not applied to
tuition fees. Here the Scots have got it more nearly right. Even here,
though, the loan is interest free. This wastes part of the advantage in
public spending terms and makes it less possible to use the extra
revenue where it should be used - on raising the participation of those
from poor families in higher education.27
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Annexe Table 1: Children under five
a in schools as a percentage of all children aged
















Source: Department for Education and Employment; National Assembly for Wales;
Scottish Executive; Northern Ireland Department of Education
Note: (a) Pupils aged 3 and 4 at 31 December each year. Data for 1999/00 for Wales and
Scotland relate to 1998/99.39
Annexe Table 2: Participation Of 3-To-5year-Olds In Education, 1991, 1996/97, %
Age
3 4 5
Belgium 97 99 99 100 98 99
France
(a) 98 100* 100 100* 99 100*
Germany
(a) 35 58 71 81 84 84
Netherlands - - 98 99 99 99
Spain 28 67 94 99 100 100
United
Kingdom
32 48 72 94 100 99
USA 33 57 90
Canada - 48 70
Japan 21 58 65
Source for 1991 data: CSO
Source for 1996/7 data: Education across Europe statistics and indicators 1999, Copyright
Eurostat
Note: * data for France 1996/97 is provisional/estimated
(a) data for 1996/7 includes students not allocated by ISCED level40
Annexe Table 3: Pupils in private schools as a percentage of school pupils




(a) 2.0 3.2 7.0 11.4 5.5
1979/80 4.8 4.5 6.9 18.3 5.8
1984/5 4.8 5.0 7.4 17.5 6.2
1989/90 5.7 5.1 7.7 16.9 6.7
1994/5 5.6 4.7 7.3 18.4 6.3
1999/00
(c) 6.0 5.0 6.7 16.5 6.2
Sources: Department for Education and Employment; National Assembly for Wales;
Scottish Executive; Northern Ireland Department of Education
Notes: (a) On an England and Wales basis, on a UK basis in other years. (b) State pupils
in 6th form and Further Education colleges are not included in these calculations. Source:
DfEE, Table 12b (and Table 13 in earlier years). (c) 99/00 figures are provisional. Figures
for Scotland are estimates using proportion of the stage rolls. Data for Wales are for
1998/99. Age at 31
st August 1999.41
Annexe TABLE 4: Gap Between The Scores Of Schools 1995-2000 (Maintained
Schools)*
Key Stage 1:
7 years, level 2+
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
Reading
75
th percentile 91 92 91 92 93
Median 82 83 83 85 86
25
th percentile 71 73 73 75 77
Writing
75
th percentile 93 92 93 94 94
Median 84 84 85 86 88
25
th percentile 73 73 74 76 78
Maths
75
th percentile 92 95 95 96 98
Median 83 88 88 90 93
25
th percentile 71 78 79 82 86
Sources: DfES Statistical Bulletins: Table 5 4/98; Table 5 03/2000; Table 6 04/01
Note: * Figures are for the 75
th percentile school, median and 25
th percentile school. They
show the % of pupils in these schools who have reached the expected level.
Gap between top and bottom state school achievements narrowed in all three subjects
and especially maths. There is a ceiling effect (top schools cannot go over 100%) but that
does not detract from the closing of the gap in absolute terms.42
Annexe Table 5: Gap Between The Scores Of Schools 1995-2000 (Maintained
Schools)*
Key stage 3: 14 years
Level 5+
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
English
75
th percentile 70 71 77 77 77
Median 55 58 65 64 65
25
th percentile 38 43 52 51 51
Maths
75
th percentile 69 72 71 74 77
Median 58 61 60 63 66
25
th percentile 44 47 46 50 53
Science
75
th percentile 68 74 69 68 73
Median 56 62 56 55 60
25
th percentile 42 46 41 40 45
Note: * Figures are for the 75
th percentile school, median and 25
th percentile school. They
show the % of pupils in these schools who have reached the expected level.
Gap narrowed in English but not in Maths or Science.4
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